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Abstract: We study a field experiment at a large technology company. Employees were 
encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements. The company randomly 
assigned 19 teams into treatment and control groups. Treatment team employees received rewards 
if their ideas were approved. Nothing changed for control team employees. Our main finding is 
that rewards substantially increased the quality of ideas. Rewards increased participation in the 
suggestion system but decreased ideas per participating employee, with zero net effect on the 
quantity of ideas. Broader participation persisted after the reward was discontinued, suggesting 
habituation. We find no evidence for motivational crowding out. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s economy, innovation is an important determinant of competitiveness and economic 
growth. “Ideation” – generation of novel business-enhancing ideas – is increasingly important. 
One source of innovation traditionally studied by academics is R&D labs, where activities are 
explicitly directed towards the development of knowledge. A less frequently studied source of 
ideas is employees in non-R&D organizational units, who may have ideas about ways to improve 
processes, customer service, or product design. Outside R&D, job definitions typically do not 
specifically include innovation, and firms may fail to tap this potential source of innovation. 
One method to access employee ideas is a formal suggestion system, which encourages 
employees to submit ideas for process and product improvements. Such a system can make ideas 
transparent to management, who can then decide about implementation, and share the knowledge 
within the company. Ohly et al. (2013) find that approximately 1 in 3 workplaces in the US and 
United Kingdom use a suggestion system. To date, little is known about how such systems work 
and whether rewards tied to submitting ideas increase participation and ideation. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a detailed picture of the ideation process in 
a company, complementing existing literature on suggestion systems. Second, we analyze 
outcomes of a randomized field experiment designed to test rewards for ideation, contributing to 
the debate about whether rewards improve or undermine creativity. We also study the relationship 
between employee characteristics and the quantity and quality of their ideas. 
The setting is HCL Technologies, a large, multinational business process outsourcing company 
based in India. It has a formal process by which employees submit new ideas, which are tracked 
through review and implementation. In an attempt to further improve the suggestion system, the 
company ran an experiment on rewards for acceptance of new ideas. The company chose 19 client 
	
				


631
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
3 
 
teams, comprised of more than 11,000 employees, and randomly assigned them to treatment and 
control groups. For 13 months, employees in treatment teams received points for ideas approved 
by clients, and additional points for favorable client feedback. Employees accumulated points to 
redeem for consumer goods. Apart from the reward, policies were identical between treatment and 
control groups. Our data includes the treatment period as well as 13 months before the experiment. 
This allows a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of rewards on ideation, 
accounting for possible pre-treatment differences between control and treatment groups. 
The experimental reward had mixed effects on ideation. Our main finding is that the quality of 
ideas (percent of ideas accepted for implementation, and percent pitched to the client) was 
substantially increased by the reward. Rewards also increased the fraction of employees 
participating in the suggestion system. This is in contrast to the notion that creativity is primarily 
a function of personality traits rather than effort-based (George & Zhou 2001). The number of 
ideas submitted per potential contributor fell, suggesting that individuals focused on more 
promising ideas, which would explain the rise in idea quality. Combined, there was no net effect 
on the total quantity of ideas. We find no evidence that the reward crowded out intrinsic motivation 
(Deci 1971; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey & Jegen 2001). Finally, we analyze a 13-month 
window after the reward ended, and find some evidence of habituation effects. 
There are extensive literatures on innovation and creativity in economics, psychology, social 
psychology, and management. Some research focuses on how personal characteristics affect 
creativity (Guilford 1950; Amabile 1983; Sauermann & Cohen 2010). Some analyzes 
organizational support, culture, or leadership (Amabile 1996; Robinson & Stern 1997; Tierney, 
Farmer & Graen 1999). Many study the effect of rewards on creativity, though findings are mixed 
(Amabile 1982, 1996; Eisenberger & Armeli 1997; Deci et al. 1999; Joussemet & Koestner 1999; 
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Eisenberger & Rhoades 2001; Eckartz et al. 2012). Some analyze how reward structure (e.g., 
magnitude; short or long term) affects creativity (Ariely et al. 2009; Azoulay et al. 2011; Ederer & 
Manso 2013) or how rewards affect different types of creativity (Charness & Grieco 2013). These 
studies typically do not consider the submission process. This matters as ideas need to be 
formulated and communicated to be effective. A field experiment is important for studying 
ideation. Both the setting (experienced subjects working on a familiar task, where payments may 
be expected) and tasks (creativity, planning, and execution) differ from typical lab experiments. 
This study complements existing studies on creativity in these respects. 
Our study is closely related to a small number of papers on employee suggestion programs. 
Most use survey data to elicit employee motivations and organizational antecedents for submitting 
ideas. Leach et al. (2006) employ data from 182 UK organizations and show that idea quantity 
correlates with scheme characteristics such as centralization, publicity, and use of rewards. van 
Dijk and van den Ende (2002) argue that reward criteria affect number of submissions. Ohly et al. 
(2013) provide a conceptual discussion and literature overview. Key indicators of scheme success 
are participation (percent of employees), adoption (percent of ideas implemented), and savings 
realized – indicators we also use. Toubia (2006) models the effect of incentives on ideation, 
focusing on free-riding in groups. He finds that incentives may improve idea generation, in a lab 
experiment. We focus on similar questions, using data from an actual employee suggestion system. 
To our knowledge, this is the first field study to offer causal evidence on the effect of rewards 
on ideation. Furthermore, we are among the first to describe and analyze a system that is becoming 
common as firms attempt to formalize innovation processes. In addition, we document a 
company’s attempt to learn and improve organizational design via field experimentation. Finally, 
we provide field evidence on whether or not rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation and creativity. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Company background 
HCL provides a variety of services, including outsourcing, R&D, and software or hardware 
solutions. Most clients are large global companies. The business process outsourcing industry has 
become increasingly competitive and commoditized. HCL seeks to differentiate by offering greater 
innovation, in the hope of increasing client retention, growth, and profit margins. For that reason, 
all employees are encouraged to suggest ideas for process or product improvements that are 
reviewed for potential implementation. If an idea might have a direct effect on a client, it is shared 
with and approved by the client before implementation. The company encourages employees to 
focus on client-facing ideas, with the strategic intent of becoming the client’s partner in innovation. 
As part of this effort, HCL set up a formal process (the “Idea Portal”) for idea submission and 
evaluation, described below. The company also ran a field experiment to test the effect of rewards 
on idea generation. Rewards were given for ideas shared with and approved by clients. It is this 
experimental reward scheme, and the Idea Portal, that we study in this paper. 
Most employees (all on teams studied here) reside in and are citizens of India. Employees are 
assigned to a specific client team, and all of their work is for that client. An employee is usually 
assigned to the same team for many years, so almost all workplace interactions take place within 
teams. This ensures confidentiality of sensitive client data. For our purposes this segmentation is 
useful because client teams work independently of each other. 
The “Idea Portal” 
The firm set up an intranet-based Idea Portal to formalize the suggestion process; it is used to 
collect, evaluate, and track ideas. All employees, regardless of position or level, are encouraged to 
devise and submit new ideas. The process is depicted in Figure 1: 
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
1. Ideation: one or more employees devise a new idea they deem worthy of suggesting. 
Employees may form ideation groups, and ideas can be submitted by 1-3 employees. An 
employee can be part of multiple ideation groups. Valid ideas might benefit a client directly, 
or indirectly by improving HCL’s internal processes and services. Examples include new 
products or services, process improvements, or new software tools. The company’s explicit 
goal is to increase value creation and innovation for clients. 
2. Submission: employees submit the idea on the Portal, including a brief description, how it 
might be implemented, and estimates of implementation costs and projected revenue. 
3. Supervisor Input / Idea Refinement: the supervisor is notified when an idea is submitted, 
and expected to review it within 3 days. The supervisor helps the employee clarify the idea, 
estimate costs and benefits, etc. as needed. This stage is refinement, not review. 
4. Executive Review Panel: first formal review of the idea. Each business unit has a review 
panel consisting of senior executives with good understanding of the client’s business. The 
panel meets regularly to discuss the client, innovation, and ideas from the Portal. The 
executives are able to place the idea in a broader business context, and judge whether it 
should be shared with the client (and possibly other parts of the organization). They 
typically do not know employees who authored the idea, or the supervisor. Once a 
supervisor vets the idea, it is essentially randomly assigned to the panel member with the 
fewest pending ideas. That executive oversees the accept / reject decision and often 
consults with fellow panel members. This stage results in one of four outcomes: the idea is 
sent back for further refinement; rejected; accepted (internal ideas); or approved internally 
and submitted to the client for approval (customer-facing ideas). 
	
				


631
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
7 
 
5. Client Review: customer-facing ideas are evaluated by the client for a final decision. 
Estimated costs and revenue may be updated based on client input. 
6. Implementation: accepted ideas are implemented, with results tracked on the Portal. 
Implementation may occur in stages; e.g., prototype development, test trials, etc. 
Implementation could be halted at any step, in which case the idea is listed as rejected in 
the data. Clients rate relevant ideas on a scale of 1-4 after implementation. 
Portal ideas are accessible by all employees, to spur ideation and spread ideas across the 
organization. However, to ensure client confidentiality, detailed idea information is visible only to 
those on the client team and higher-level executives. The Portal was a mature, robust system prior 
to the reward experiment. It had already processed several thousand ideas. 
Experimental reward program 
Employees were motivated to suggest ideas prior to the experiment, due to intrinsic motivation, 
career concerns, and recognition from clients, teammates, supervisors, reviewing managers, and 
the rest of the organization. Until the experiment, however, there was no formal reward for ideas. 
The company decided to run an experiment to see if rewards could further improve ideation. 
It wanted to reinforce its goal for the Portal, encouraging employees to become a source of 
innovation for clients. HCL hoped the reward would stimulate bottom-up cultural change, in which 
employees would ask for more and better help from their supervisor. They felt it would be more 
effective at generating valuable ideas than top-down management pressure. HCL also wanted to 
encourage employees to submit ideas on the Portal rather than implement them on their own. This 
would increase transparency, allowing management to observe improvements and communicate 
them to clients as appropriate. Moreover, the company believed that ideas entered on the Portal 
would spur knowledge sharing and spillovers across the company. 
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The company has a reward program in which employees earn points for accomplishments; e.g., 
work on a specific initiative. Employees accumulate points and exchange them for consumer goods 
(e.g., a smartphone) or vouchers for an online store.1 Such programs are not unusual in Asian 
companies. It applies to all employees and had been in place several years prior to the experiment. 
For the experiment, the company offered new reward points for ideation on the Portal. 
The experiment was run with 19 teams. Senior executives participated in selection, ensuring 
that well-established teams (more than $2 million revenue, at least 50 employees, and average 
client satisfaction of at least 25 on a scale of –100 to 100), with active use of the Portal (at least 5 
ideas submitted per month, with at least 1 shared with the client), were used for the experiment. 
Thus, participating teams were pre-selected from the entire workforce, and our analysis is 
conditional on this selection. However, selection for teams that use the Portal regularly is 
advantageous for our purposes, since it makes study teams more homogeneous. If anything, it is 
likely to yield conservative estimates of the effect of rewards on ideation. Teams were randomly 
assigned to treatment or control (roughly 6,000 and 5,400 employees respectively). 
Employees in control teams continued to receive no rewards for contributing ideas. Employees 
in treatment teams received an experimental reward, designed to motivate quality, not quantity. 
Submission of an idea alone did not merit a reward. Employees could not know ex ante if approved 
ideas would be implemented internally, or submitted to the client, so they had an incentive to 
consider the client when developing ideas. If the idea was accepted by the client, each member of 
the ideating team earned 2,000 points. 2,000 points was worth approximately 2.2% of monthly 
after-tax salary for lower level employees. After implementation, authors could earn additional 
                                                 
1 Gift vouchers and goods from the category “Kids” were the most common redemptions. 
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points depending on client rating of the idea. If the idea received the highest rating of 4, the 
employee earned additional points worth approximately 40% of monthly after-tax salary of lower-
level employees.2 Therefore, rewards were significant, especially for ideas rated highly by clients.  
Apart from the reward, there were no policy differences between treatment and control groups. 
Review processes, and supervisor and manager incentives, did not change in either group. 
Communications and training about innovation were corporate-wide and not affected by the 
experiment. Employees in treatment teams were not told the reward was an experiment. Control 
team employees, review panels, and clients did not know about the experiment. 
A concern in such settings may be spillovers between control and treatment teams, or from HR 
to control teams. Such concerns are likely limited in this case. Employees generally stay in their 
team for many years.3 Most or all workplace interactions are with team members and the client. 
Many teams are physically segregated. The experiment was not discussed broadly within the 
company, in part out of concern that other teams would request the reward. 
The company designed and conducted the experiment on its own. The executive in charge of 
the Portal and experiment was a former student of one author, so we had high-level access to clarify 
                                                 
2 Management believes rewards were substantial and motivated employees. One employee told us 
he earned an LCD TV because of his ideas, and argued this was a huge benefit given its price. 
3 Measured between the two points in time for which we have rosters, 0.9% of employees switch 
teams; 0.1% between control and treatment teams. According to management, no employee 
switched between treatment and control teams during the treatment, so the 0.1% changed prior to 
the experiment. A related concern might be sorting; e.g., creative employees shifting to teams with 
the reward. We ran regressions with employee fixed effects, and results are very similar. 
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questions. We visited headquarters twice to learn about the company’s organization, strategy, 
culture, and innovation processes. We interviewed employees in some control and treatment teams 
about their work and innovation, without disclosing the experiment or purpose of our study. We 
followed up with numerous telephone discussions with management. 
3. PREDICTIONS 
Employees entered ideas into the Portal even without the experimental reward. We study 
incremental effects on innovation from introducing explicit rewards. There are three relevant 
dimensions to ideation, given our data: participation (attempt to develop and submit ideas); and 
quality and quantity of ideas conditional on participation. 
Consider first participation. the paper, “participation” means an employee is willing and able 
to submit ideas. However, he or she may not submit an idea, if they do not develop a suitable idea, 
or do not have time to submit the idea in the Portal. Explanation of how participation is estimated 
is in the Methods section. Willingness to participate depends on rewards and costs from doing so. 
In HCL employees are encouraged to enter ideas, but many do not participate. Presumably this is 
because the cost of thinking about ideas or using the system, on top of normal work, outweighs 
the perceived benefit. The experiment provides additional benefit, which should increase the 
likelihood that an employee participates in ideation. 
The reward might also affect idea quality. We use two measures, also employed by the firm in 
analyzing these programs: the probability an idea is Implemented, and the probability it is Shared 
with the client. These are natural measures, as only worthwhile ideas are implemented and HCL’s 
goal was to generate more ideas to share with the client. They are imperfect due to the subjective 
nature of idea evaluation. This is a common issue in the innovation literature, which uses measures 
such as number of patents filed or granted. 
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Psychologists argue that there may be a cognitive tradeoff between quality and quantity in 
ideation.4 Employees might face a choice between “exploration” – pursuing new directions – and 
“exploitation” – pursuing familiar directions for incremental innovation (Robbins 1952; Gittins 
1979). The former is less likely to generate new ideas, but such ideas may have higher expected 
value or quality. The latter may generate more ideas, but of lower quality. Idea quality likely 
depends on time and thought spent elaborating and describing the idea, instead of on other ideas. 
Moreover, since the experiment rewarded quality but not quantity, we expect average quality of 
ideas to increase, particularly among Prior Ideators (employees who submitted ideas pre-
treatment). A possible countervailing effect might come from employees who were not Prior 
Ideators. The marginal employee not ideating pre-treatment may be less creative than those who 
did participate. If she decides to participate due to the reward, it might lower average idea quality. 
The effect of the reward on the quantity of ideas is similarly unclear. If participation increases, 
that will tend to increase quantity. However, if there is a quantity-quality tradeoff, the average 
quantity of ideas submitted by a given employee (conditional on participation) might fall. Thus, 
theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction for the direction of the treatment effect on 
average idea quality and quantity. One goal of the paper is to study this empirically. 
It is often argued that pay for performance “crowds out” intrinsic motivation. There are several 
rationales. One is overjustification (Deci et al. 1999). In this view, extrinsic rewards are more 
salient than intrinsic motivation, and motivation shifts when extrinsic rewards are instituted. An 
alternative is signaling (Benabou & Tirole 2006). The idea is that employees who ideate without 
                                                 
4 A cognitive tradeoff between idea quantity and quality suggests multitask incentives (Holmstrom 
& Milgrom 1991). The experiment rewarded high quality ideas rather than merely quantity. 
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rewards signal to themselves and / or others that they are intrinsically motivated. The theory 
assumes they do not have perfect knowledge about their motivations, and make inferences about 
their own character from their actions. Rewards make ideation attractive to extrinsically motivated 
types, thereby decreasing its signaling value for intrinsic motivation. 
The crowding out view suggests that incentive effects of rewards may be mitigated by a 
reduction in intrinsic motivation, with unclear net effect. However, if there is crowding out, the net 
effect should vary with the extent to which employees are intrinsically motivated. The data allow 
us to crudely group individuals by degree of intrinsic motivation and test this. Consider employees 
in the pre-treatment period, without rewards. On average, intrinsic motivation among employees 
who ideate should be higher than among those who do not. Therefore, crowding out effects in the 
treatment period should be more pronounced for the first group. 
Crowding out theories do not distinguish between participation in ideation, and idea quantity 
and quality, so we study all three. Participation is the concept that seems most closely aligned with 
the literature. If there is motivational crowding out, the experimental reward should have a smaller 
(possibly negative) effect on participation for employees who previously participated, compared 
to those who did not. It might have similar effects on idea quantity or quality. 
4. DATA & METHODS 
Data were collected from the Portal. Each record contains IDs of idea authors and client team, 
dates of submission and latest update, verbal description, and estimates of costs of implementation 
and projected revenue. Estimates are provided initially by employees in consultation with their 
supervisor, but may be updated upon implementation with client input. We estimate idea profit as 
revenue minus cost. Current idea status (e.g., under review, rejected, under implementation) is 
recorded. Finally, the Portal records client ratings on a four-point scale. However, for most ideas 
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this is missing, as not all suggestions were shared, and few clients used this option. We have 
records for all ideas suggested during 13 months prior to treatment (Period 1: May 2009-May 
2010), the 13 months of treatment (Period 2: June 2010-June 2011), and 13 months after treatment 
(Period 3: July 2011-July 2012). Data on idea acceptance / rejection was updated in January 2013. 
We added information about employees who did not submit ideas, in order to study the rate of 
participation in ideation. Rosters were provided for April 2010 and July 2011. We do not know 
exactly when employees entered or exited, so cannot construct exact rosters each month. However, 
these provide good approximations for pre-experimental and experimental periods.5 Finally, we 
collected employee gender, age, company tenure, and 9 salary groups corresponding to hierarchical 
levels (Level 0 is entry; Level 8 executives). The online appendix contains variable descriptions. 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents explanatory variable descriptive statistics by treatment group each period. The 
groups are similar in age, tenure, gender, salary, and share of prior ideators. The only statistically 
significant difference is that employees in treatment teams were slightly younger pre-treatment. 
We therefore control for individual factors in all regressions; results are not sensitive to inclusion 
of these variables. As is common in technology firms, employees are relatively young and tenure 
relatively short. Almost 80% are male. The number of employees increased substantially from 
                                                 
5 For quantity regressions we added inactive employees from the April 2010 roster (end of pre-
treatment period) to both periods, and from the July 2011 roster (end of treatment period) to the 
treatment period. Allocating only April 2010 employees to the pre-treatment period resulted in 
very similar estimates. This confirms difference-in-differences addresses the concern that we do 
not have exact rosters, because incomplete information affects both groups the same way. 
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periods 1 to 2, reflecting company growth, as well as that Period 1 data is less complete. We have 
only Roster 1 in the first period, whereas we can use both rosters in the second period. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on outcome variables by period and group. Despite 
randomization, control and treatment teams are somewhat different. Employees in control teams 
were more likely to suggest at least one idea, in both periods. The share of ideating employees 
declined in both groups in the treatment period, with a stronger drop in the control group. These 
differences highlight the need to control for pre-treatment differences and time trends in our 
statistical analyses.6 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The last columns present descriptive statistics on three measures of idea quality. The first two 
indicate decisions made about each idea: accepted for implementation (Imp), and shared with the 
client (Shared). Both are the result of a review process and only reported for ideas with finished 
review (Fin). These measures reflect idea quality, since better ideas have a higher chance of 
acceptance, and it was the company’s explicit goal to have more ideas to share with clients. The 
percent of ideas accepted for implementation increased in both the treatment and control groups 
                                                 
6 Pre-treatment differences are not unexpected due to the small number of teams. As long as pre-
treatment differences are uncorrelated with treatment response, they will not affect treatment effect 
estimates because we control for initial differences. We conducted robustness checks by including 
average team performance in Period 1 as an explanatory variable for Period 2 performance. 
Direction and magnitude of estimated treatment effects are similar to those below. 
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over time, with a stronger increase in the treatment group. The probability of sharing an idea with 
the client increased in the treatment group, but decreased in the control group. 
We also report estimated profits (net value), the difference between estimated revenue and cost 
of an idea. This measure varied substantially across ideas. Some ideas had very small projected 
financial impact, while one idea was estimated to improve revenue by $22 million.  
Unfortunately, the last potential measure, client idea rating on a 4-point scale, was given for 
only 17% of ideas. Moreover, there appear to be serious selection issues. 85% of ratings are 3 or 
4. Only 1 of 306 ratings received the lowest score of 1. This suggests that clients only reported 
ratings when they were happy with the idea, and used other channels to report dissatisfaction. We 
therefore do not use client ratings in our analysis. 
Methods 
Measuring and explaining the quantity of ideas 
One of our main dependent variables is Number of Ideas, the total number of ideas submitted 
by an employee in either the pre-treatment or treatment period. The unit of observation for this 
analysis is therefore an employee-period. A large fraction of employees (91.4%) did not submit 
ideas, resulting in a large number of zeros for this variable. The prevalence of zeros disqualifies 
simple count data models such as Poisson or negative binomial (NB) regression.7 
                                                 
7 Poisson assumes equality of conditional mean 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and conditional variance, which results in 
biased estimates for overdispersed data (conditional variance larger than mean). Negative binomial 
regression (type II) generalizes the Poisson model, assuming Var(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛼𝛼𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖), where 𝛼𝛼 is 
an additional parameter. The NB model reduces to the Poisson for 𝛼𝛼 = 0. Estimating the NB model 
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We therefore analyze the data using a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB), a 
generalization of NB used in particular for overdispersed data. ZINB is a mixture model, 
explaining the dependent count data variable jointly with a negative binomial process and a logit 
process. The intuition is that two are simultaneously at work in the data generating process. (1) 
The logit models participation: the employee’s basic willingness or ability to submit an idea. (2) 
If (1) is fulfilled, the NB models the generation and submission of ideas, where the number of 
ideas is drawn from the negative binomial distribution. The logit accounts for “excess zeros” not 
explained by the negative binomial distribution. A zero observed in the data could be caused either 
by an employee not participating in ideation (condition (1) not fulfilled), or wanting to ideate but 
not having an idea that period (condition (1) fulfilled, but the draw in (2) is zero). 
Formally, let f1 = Pr(Participation) be parameterized as a logistic function, and f2(y) be the 
probability mass of count y in the negative binomial distribution. The mass of count y in the zero 
inflated negative binomial model is: 
𝑔𝑔(𝑦𝑦) = �(1 − 𝑓𝑓1) + 𝑓𝑓1𝑓𝑓2(0), 𝑦𝑦 = 0
𝑓𝑓1𝑓𝑓2(𝑦𝑦), 𝑦𝑦 > 0  
The NB model is a special case where f1 = 1.8 The ZINB model is well suited for our data, as 
the two processes allow us to effectively address overdispersion, and have meaningful 
                                                 
with our data, we find significant overdispersion, indicating Poisson regression is unsuitable. We 
also report quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson regression estimates in Table 3, which do 
not impose a specific functional form for variance and can therefore account for overdispersion. 
8 Because we cluster standard errors, the objective functions of the models are pseudo-likelihoods, 
so common tests to discriminate between models (likelihood ratio test for NB v. ZINB; Vuong test 
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interpretations in our context. They allow us to model the submission decision hierarchically. The 
logit provides information on whether or not an employee participated in ideation. If the answer is 
no, the observed number of ideas is zero. These zeros indicate that an employee is not participating: 
they might be unmotivated to look for ideas, might shy away from using the Portal, or might work 
on a project with little or no room for ideation. If the answer is “yes,” we may still observe zero 
ideas from this employee, if they did not come up with an idea, even though actively looking for 
one and willing to use the system. Positive counts are only observed when both processes are 
positive; i.e., the employee was motivated to ideate and also had an idea. 
The latent class character of the zero inflated model allows us to disentangle these two causes 
of non-ideation, whereas standard count data models or OLS do not. The logit and negative 
binomial processes of the ZINB are specified as follows: 
(1) Logit: Pr(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = exp(𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 )/(exp(𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 ) + 1). 
(2) NB: Negative binomial model with conditional mean exp(𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁). 
Estimating treatment effects 
In all regressions, we use linear or nonlinear difference-in-differences estimations to infer the 
causal effect of the treatment on ideation. This addresses several potential problems; e.g., pre-
treatment performance differences, possible time trends (decrease over time because low-hanging 
fruit have been picked), and approximation of number of non-ideating employees per period. To 
estimate the treatment effect, we specify 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  that appears in both equations (1) and (2) as follows: 
                                                 
for ZINB v. zero inflated Poisson) are not applicable. Similar tests for clustered data are not yet 
common. Taking pseudo-likelihoods as true likelihoods, Akaike’s information criterion, likelihood 
ratio, and Vuong tests all favor ZINB significantly over Poisson, NB, and zero inflated Poisson. 
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 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑗𝑗  𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  for 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐿𝐿,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁}, 
where β1 is the difference-in-differences treatment effect estimate. Treatment is the treatment group 
dummy, Period 2 is the treatment period dummy, Xit is a vector of employee characteristics, and 
Ci is the client team fixed effect that accounts for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity 
between teams. The time invariant dummy Treatment is not estimated separately, because it is 
absorbed by client team fixed effects (every team is either in the treatment group or not). Index i 
denotes the author and t denotes pre- or treatment period. To control for time trends or time-specific 
shocks, we use time fixed effects in the form of a treatment period dummy. Note that the 
coefficients of the logit (L) and NB process are not constrained to be equal, which allows us to 
determine whether treatment affects the two processes differently. 
Employees within a client team regularly interact, so the assumption of independence between 
observations (employees) is likely violated. We therefore cluster standard errors in all regressions 
at the team level to allow for arbitrary correlation in error terms within a team.9 
                                                 
9 The low number (19) of clusters is a concern because our cluster and heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors are only valid asymptotically. However, we have reason to expect the standard 
errors are valid. Bertrand et al. (2004, Table VIII) show (for OLS) that clustered standard errors 
exhibit only small bias for 20 clusters. If there is no effect in artificially generated data, the null 
hypothesis rejection rate based on these standard errors is 5.8%, when it should be 5%. Block 
bootstrap, the primary alternative, rejects the null in 13% of cases (their Table V). We also 
estimated several linear models with the wild bootstrap procedure. Cameron et al. (2008) 
demonstrate in simulations that the procedure does not over-reject. The t statistics from the 
procedure are virtually identical to those with clustered standard errors in our linear models. 
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5. RESULTS 
Who ideates? 
Before we evaluate the experiment, we provide a brief overview of the correlates of ideation 
with employee characteristics. Even though this is not a causal analysis, the question is of intrinsic 
interest, as it provides insights into the ideation process and lays a foundation for understanding 
the reward effects analyzed below. The results are displayed in Table 3. Our measures of ideation 
are the probability of submitting at least one idea within the 13-month pre-treatment period and 
the number of ideas submitted. We report average marginal effects (AME). 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
We control separately for age and company tenure (marginal effects of both are based on linear 
and quadratic terms in all models). Age is negatively related to both outcome measures. On 
average, an additional year of age decreases the probability that an employee submits at least one 
idea by about 0.7 percent, and decreases the number of ideas per employee by about 0.017 
(according to the more conservative ZINB estimate), or by 0.08 (according to the quasi-maximum 
likelihood Poisson estimate). These estimates suggest that older employees are less likely to 
contribute to the Idea Portal, and submit fewer ideas on average. An explanation may be that 
younger employees are more creative. Alternatively, the Portal might be more attractive to them, 
as they are more accustomed to using new technology. Finally, they may be more aware of recent 
technological developments, such as new software programming techniques. 
The effect of tenure is positive and statistically significant for both measures. One might expect 
that employees with longer tenure already suggested ideas that came to mind and have fewer new 
ones, but our findings suggest the opposite. This may be because working at the company longer 
develops deeper understanding of the business and client, leading to more ideas. 
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Finally, consider the effects of hierarchical level. Senior management (salary groups 4 and 
above) is the reference category. Low-level groups 0 and 1 are pooled, because group 0 is too small 
for meaningful analysis on its own. The only statistically significant effect is that ideating low-
level employees contributed about 0.5 fewer ideas in 13 months than active high-level employees, 
according to the more conservative ZINB estimate. The mechanism behind this might be similar 
to the one for tenure. Both correlate with firm-specific human capital and job match. Employees 
higher up in the hierarchy tend to have greater responsibility, control more resources, manage more 
subordinates, and have a higher-level understanding of the firm’s and client’s business and needs. 
Treatment effects 
Quantity of ideas 
We now analyze effects of the experiment, starting with idea quantity. Table 4 displays OLS 
estimates and average marginal effects (AME) for the zero inflated negative binomial model 
(columns 1-2), modeling an employee’s number of ideas per period.10 In the ZINB model, quantity 
is modeled hierarchically with a logit capturing participation, and a negative binomial describing 
number of ideas, given participation. Column 2 displays marginal effects for both processes jointly. 
Columns 3-4 display marginal effects for logit and negative binomial processes separately. ZINB 
matches best with the idea generation and submission process, so we focus on those estimates. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Looking at partial effects first, the treatment effect is significantly positive in the logit process, 
suggesting rewards increased the share of employees motivated to participate – to think about ideas 
                                                 
10 Table I in the online appendix displays estimates of the ZINB model rather than the average 
marginal effects displayed in Table 4, and nuisance parameter estimates not displayed in Table 4. 
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and submit them on the Portal. According to the average marginal effect, the rewards are estimated 
to increase the share of potential contributors by almost 18 percentage points, which is also 
economically significant. This accords with our prediction described above. 
Interestingly, this positive effect is countered by a decrease in the number of ideas per author, 
as indicated by the negative binomial process. This result suggests that potential contributors 
submit about 0.26 fewer ideas during the 13-month treatment as a result of the reward program. 
The overall effect of rewards on the quantity of ideas is economically and statistically zero (see 
OLS and ZINB estimates in columns 1-2); the positive and negative partial effects cancel out. 
Consequently, ideation is spread over more employees, who concentrate on fewer ideas. This is 
consistent with a potential tradeoff between the quantity and quality of ideas. 
The zero overall effect might be explained by crowding out, if intrinsically-motivated 
employees were negatively affected by the reward and consequently submitted fewer ideas. We 
use pre-treatment data to categorize intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation should, on average, 
be stronger for those who ideated pre-treatment – without rewards – than among those who did 
not. We therefore proxy intrinsic motivation with the dummy Prior Ideator, which equals 1 if an 
employee submitted at least one idea in the pre-treatment period, and is still in the sample in the 
treatment period. The second condition ensures these employees have the opportunity to contribute 
again. About 8% of employees fall into this category in period 1. Columns 5-6 present the results 
of a model that allows the treatment effect to vary by whether or not the employee is a prior ideator. 
The models we estimate are identical to the main analyses presented above, except that: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 
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for both the logit and NB process. The average treatment effect for prior ideators evaluated at 
sample values of all other covariates is: 
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 1
2𝑁𝑁
∑ ∑ [𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 +2𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾) − 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾)],  
where F is the nonlinear function of the model (e.g., logistic) and it denotes the observation. This 
average treatment effect (ATE) is displayed in columns 5-6 of Table 4. Informally, the treatment 
effect in the logit (column 5) is the change in the fraction of potential contributors among prior 
ideators in the treatment group, relative to that change among prior ideators in the control group.  
The results in columns 5-6 of Table 4 suggest that prior ideators in the treatment group are not 
more likely to participate (logit process). This is not surprising, as the logit can be interpreted as 
describing whether the employee actively looks for ideas and is able to use the Portal. The latter is 
necessarily true for those who previously submitted ideas. However, rewards appear to have 
induced those who did not previously suggest ideas to participate, increasing the fraction of 
potential contributors by about 6.5 percentage points.11 In the negative binomial process, treatment 
reduced the average number of suggested ideas by 0.76 for all other participating employees, while 
the effect on prior ideators is not significantly different from zero. The overall effect on number of 
ideas submitted (not displayed) is –0.021 for prior ideators, and –0.052 for employees who had 
not previously suggested ideas. The evidence does not support the crowding out hypothesis that 
rewards reduce intrinsic motivation. Finally, the findings are consistent with a cognitive tradeoff 
                                                 
11 One might expect treatment effect in column 3 to be between those of subgroups in column 5. 
This is a nonlinear model with separate trends for each subgroup so this need not be the case. 
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between quantity and quality in ideation, and a rebalancing of multitask incentives towards quality. 
To shed more light on these questions, we now investigate the effect of the reward on idea quality. 
Quality of ideas 
For quality analyses we focus on ideas rather than authors. Idea j may have several authors Nj, 
so we split each idea into Nj observations, each with characteristics Xi of author i, where i = 1, …, 
Nj. Hence, the unit of observation is the author-idea in quality analyses. To ensure that single- and 
multi-author ideas get the same weight, we weight each idea j by 1/Nj. This allows us to explain 
idea outcomes with both author- and idea-specific variables. We use three quality measures: 
whether the idea was shared with the client, whether it was implemented, and its net value. 
Consider first the dummy variable Shared, which equals 1 if an idea was shared with the client, 
and zero otherwise. Every idea is first reviewed internally, and the panel decides whether or not to 
share it with the client. Shared is a meaningful measure of quality for two reasons. First, it would 
be unwise of the company to bother clients with bad or trivial ideas. Second, the firm’s goal was 
to increase its perceived value to the customer. Value-added is more salient for ideas that are 
explicitly communicated to the client than for ideas implemented without communication to 
clients. In Table 5 we report OLS coefficients and logit marginal effects of the following models: 
OLS: 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 if 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 1, 
Logit: Prob�𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑰𝑰𝑗𝑗 ,𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 1� = exp�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�exp�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+1 , 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1Treatment𝑖𝑖 ∙ Period 2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑰𝑰𝑗𝑗′𝛿𝛿 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 . Treatment is the treatment 
group dummy, Xim is a vector of employee characteristics at time of submission, Ij is a vector of 
idea-specific variables including project type, Ci is the client team fixed effect of employee i, and 
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Tm is the monthly time fixed effect.12 Index i denotes the author, j the idea, and m the month of 
submission. Results are robust to estimating trend by period or month fixed effects. Analyses only 
include ideas with a final decision as Shared and Implemented are only available after review.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Columns 1-2 of Table 5 report results for the probability an idea is shared with the client. We 
find a substantial and statistically significant positive treatment effect. Depending on the model, 
the treatment increased the probability of sharing the idea by 19-21 percentage points. This 
suggests the treatment worked as intended. This could be due to employees shifting focus towards 
customer-related ideas, or increasing idea quality without a shift in focus. Both would increase the 
likelihood an idea is shared with the customer. 
A second quality measure is Implemented: 1 if the idea is accepted for implementation, 0 if 
not. This is a measure of quality as the company has incentives to only approve worthwhile ideas. 
Implemented and Shared differ because an idea may be implemented without being shared with 
the client, or approved internally but rejected by the client (shared but not implemented). Results 
are in columns 3-4 of Table 5. Models are the same as above for Shared, with Implemented as the 
dependent variable. Once more we find a large positive and statistically significant treatment 
effect. Rewards improve the likelihood of implementation by 15-18 percentage points. 
                                                 
12 A priori, one might think treatment affects the number of idea authors, which in turn might 
influence the probability an idea is shared. Including number of authors as a control would then 
bias treatment effect estimates. We found no statistically or economically significant treatment 
effect on number of authors, so include it in all quality regressions to improve fit. Treatment effect 
estimates are even larger when it is excluded. See Table II of the online appendix. 
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A third potential measure of idea quality is estimated Profit. This is part of the idea submission 
on the Portal and often uses supervisor input. Employees and supervisors receive training on how 
to assess costs and benefits. Estimates may be modified during executive review, and updated after 
implementation (our data are the most recent estimates). The company compared realized with 
predicted values. They told us they found estimates to be “very accurate,” reflecting the training. 
One might think the company would accept all ideas with positive profit, and vice versa. 
However, this is not the case. Strategic considerations, such as development of new competencies, 
client relationships, or synergies with other ideas induce the company to accept some ideas with 
negative net value and reject some with positive value. In general, the company places no emphasis 
on high dollar-value ideas, but rather wants employees to think about all ideas that may have any 
client benefit. This was true in treatment and control groups. Therefore, we have no reason to 
believe net profits would be affected by the treatment but include the regression for completeness. 
Table 5 column 5 shows OLS results for projected profit, measured as the log of revenue minus 
cost. Note that ideas with zero or negative net value drop out with a log-transformation. We 
therefore also ran a linear model; it yielded the same qualitative results with inferior fit. Point 
estimates of the treatment effect are substantial and positive. An estimate of 0.308 in the log-linear 
specification implies a treatment effect of about +36%. However, the effect is not significantly 
different from zero, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that treatment had no effect on profit. 
We tested for motivational crowding out, using quality measures and expected profit, by 
comparing treatment effects on prior ideators to those on all other employees. None of the 
regressions (available upon request) showed a significant difference in the treatment effect. Hence, 
there is no evidence of crowding out with respect to idea quality. 
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Regressions in Table 5 include author characteristics. Two points are worth mentioning. First, 
tenure is positively correlated with the probability an idea is shared, and with profit. Since these 
regressions control for salary group, this is in line with our finding of a positive correlation between 
tenure and quantity of ideas. Both results suggest firm- and / or client-specific human capital may 
improve ideation. Second, ideas with more authors have higher average quality for all measures. 
This is consistent with research finding that collaboration, particularly between those with different 
perspectives and skills, improves the quality of innovation (Ford & Sullivan 2004; Shin & Zhou 
2007). An alternative explanation is that authors pool ideas and submit the best among them. 
Suppose N authors randomly form a group, and each author i has one idea of quality Yi. Group 
quality, the Nth order statistic Y(N) = max{Y1, …, YN}, increases in N even without collaboration. 
As a robustness check we ran the regressions as in Table 5 without employee controls (Table 
II, online appendix). Results are very similar, which shows that the difference-in-differences 
specification and controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity between client teams are 
important, but employee or idea level controls are not. 
In sum, we find large positive treatment effects on idea quality, measured by the probability an 
idea is implemented, and probability it is shared with the client. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that estimated profits are unaffected by the experiment. In line with our findings on 
quantity, there is no evidence of motivational crowding out. The increase in idea quality might 
explain the drop in quantity per author detected above, reflecting a cognitive tradeoff between 
exploration and exploitation, and a response to multitask incentives rebalanced towards quality. 
Post-treatment effects  
The company discontinued the reward scheme after the 13-month experiment. We collected 
data for the 13 months that followed. This allows us to examine whether the positive treatment 
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effects on participation and idea quality persisted, which might suggest habituation, or 
disappeared. Alternatively, one might expect a reduction in idea quantity and quality – either 
because the incentive was removed, or due to perceived unfairness associated with removing the 
reward. Table 6 displays results on quantity and quality, now including a post-treatment effect 
(DID Post-treatment) for the 13 months following the experiment.  
The post-treatment effect on the share of potential contributors (logit process of the ZINB 
model) remains positive and significant. Employees who became potential contributors due to 
rewards tended to continue participation after the reward was discontinued. This result might 
reflect habituation. Another potential explanation is that rewards changed the working culture of 
treatment teams, fostering greater attention to, or peer pressure for, ideation. Alternatively, the 
reward might have better communicated the importance to the firm of employee ideas, thereby 
changing implicit incentives. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to disentangle these 
alternative interpretations. The effect on the number of ideas per potential contributor (negative 
binomial process, column 2) is insignificant in the post-treatment period. The overall effect on the 
quantity of ideas remains statistically and economically insignificant. 
The table also reports results for one of our quality measures, Shared (effects are similar when 
using Implemented as the dependent variable). Interestingly, the treatment effect on quality 
vanished after elimination of the reward scheme, even though the treatment effect on participation 
remains. Apparently, employees continue to think about and submit ideas, but they no longer focus 
their effort on ideas with a high probability of client acceptance. Instead, they return to baseline 
with respect to idea quality. This could also explain why the effect on the number of ideas per 
participating employee becomes insignificant (column 2). Taken together, these findings are 
consistent with changes in multitask incentives during and after the treatment. In this view, the 
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rewards induced employees to spend additional effort fine-tuning and improving ideas to increase 
their odds of receiving a reward. Once the rewards were eliminated, relative incentives to 
emphasize quality returned to their original level. This is interesting for both theory and 
application, as it suggests that the quality of ideas can be manipulated with rewards. 
Discussion of results 
Organizational policies sometimes create unintended side effects that might confound our 
findings. Here we discuss three issues: distorted multitask incentives (Holmstrom & Milgrom 
1991), influence costs (Milgrom & Roberts 1988), and favoritism (Prendergast & Topel 1996). 
First consider distorted incentives. The Portal or experimental reward might have motivated 
employees to submit ideas that barely pass the implementation threshold, or that differ from ideas 
in non-treatment accounts in other ways (e.g., implementation risk). In addition, employees might 
have been induced to distort their description of an idea, how it would be implemented, or its costs 
and benefits, in order to increase odds of acceptance. Several features of the Portal mitigate such 
concerns. Supervisor consultation is a check that the description is not overstated, so the panel and 
client have the proper information for decisions. Career concerns give supervisors implicit 
incentives to avoid pushing marginal ideas. Panel members have significant human capital and 
high-level perspectives, so are in an excellent position to evaluate an idea’s costs and tangible and 
intangible benefits. Being responsible for business unit success, they also have strong motivation 
to approve only valuable ideas. Further, the executive assigned to oversee the idea often consults 
other panelists, ensuring multiple perspectives and reducing biases. The most significant ideas are 
then vetted by the client, which has every incentive to reject poor ideas. Finally, ideas with 
substantial costs and complexity might be cancelled during implementation, reducing risk. 
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The experimental reward was designed to avoid distorting incentives. It did not reward mere 
suggestion of an idea, which would likely motivate employees to submit more ideas with little 
concern for cost, risk, or effect on the client. It only rewarded ideas accepted by clients. Moreover, 
the largest reward was for high client rating after implementation. These factors motivated 
employees to submit ideas of high quality from the client’s perspective. 
An additional concern is influence costs: employees might lobby the supervisor, review panel, 
or client to accept their ideas. A closely related concern is favoritism, in which supervisors, the 
review panel, or clients might be biased into accepting ideas suggested by employees whom they 
know and work with personally. Once more, the evaluation process makes such concerns unlikely 
to be significant, with or without the experimental reward. Control and treatment teams may have 
several thousand employees. Most employees who suggest ideas are several hierarchical levels 
below members of the review panel and do not personally know panel members. Ideas are 
randomly assigned to a review panel executive, and reviewed within 20 days, so employees cannot 
anticipate who will handle their idea, and have little time to maneuver once the idea is assigned. If 
their idea is shared, an employee’s client contacts are usually several levels below the client 
decision maker, giving little room for lobbying. Further, review panel members and client decision 
makers have strong incentives to promote business goals, and little incentive to favor ideas from 
one employee over another, even if they personally knew an ideator. Thus, there is virtually no 
scope for influence costs or favoritism between the employee and either the review panel or client. 
Influence costs and favoritism are most likely play a role between the employee and supervisor. 
However, as described above, that stage is idea refinement, not evaluation. The company hopes 
that employees “lobby” their supervisor for help improving the idea. Conceivably, the supervisor 
could help the employee write the idea description to understate concerns and overstate benefits, 
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but doing so would risk damaging the supervisor’s reputation, evaluation, and prospects. Such a 
discovery is highly likely given the considerations described above. There may be some tendency 
towards favoritism, but it seems likely that supervisors will focus more on helping employees 
improve ideas rather than distort how they are presented. 
The reward design also mitigates influence costs and favoritism. Clients were not aware of the 
experiment and, hence, did not know that rewards were at stake for ideators. Incentives for 
supervisors and review panel executives were not changed. Employees were rewarded for idea 
quality, not quantity. Therefore, it seems likely that the experimental reward motivated employees 
to ask supervisors for help in improving ideas, if anything. 
Summing up, the Portal and reward were designed thoughtfully, and seem likely to avoid 
serious issues with distorted incentives, influence costs, or favoritism. However, we conducted 
several tests (available on request) seeking evidence for these problems. If lobbying drove results, 
the treatment effect should be larger for those with good contacts and expertise for successful 
lobbying. We investigated whether treatment effects varied by company tenure or hierarchical 
level, and found no differential effects for these groups. We checked whether other idea attributes, 
such as risk, changed with introduction of the reward. The data have no direct measure of idea risk, 
but we investigated estimated cost and log cost. We find no evidence that ideas become more or 
less costly due to the reward. Indeed, regressions on cost and log cost yield different signs for 
treatment effects, suggesting no clear directional effect. Further, as shown above, idea estimated 
net value is not affected by the reward, reinforcing the conclusion that idea quality did not suffer. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a unique statistical analysis of employee innovation. Data from a 
company’s employee suggestion system allow analysis of effects of a reward for fostering ideation, 
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implemented as a randomized field experiment. Our findings are of interest for the debate on the 
effects of incentives on creativity and intrinsic motivation. Most prior literature uses survey data, 
case studies, or laboratory experiments to study creativity. This study analyses experienced 
individuals performing their regular work. Moreover, random assignment to control and treatment 
groups, and use of difference-in-differences estimation, facilitate causal inferences. 
Our findings suggest that rewards are a suitable tool to induce employees to think about process 
and product improvements, and to use a formal ideation system. The reward scheme substantially 
increased the likelihood that employees participate in the Idea Portal. Broadening participation 
was, in fact, one of the company’s objectives. In fact, once familiar with the system, employees 
continued using it even in the absence of the reward scheme, suggesting habituation. 
A main finding is that the treatment succeeded in increasing idea quality, measured by percent 
of ideas shared with the client, and percent of ideas implemented. At the same time the quantity of 
submitted ideas was not affected. Interestingly, employees returned to baseline with respect to the 
number and quality of ideas they suggest when the rewards were discontinued. Treatment and post-
treatment responses on quality suggest that employees can fine-tune ideation and are responsive 
to incentives when doing so. The results are consistent with the notion of a quantity-quality tradeoff 
that may be addressed with multitask incentives. Proper choice of a performance measure is likely 
important. If the company had rewarded each submission rather than idea acceptance, we would 
likely have observed an increase in idea quantity at the expense of quality. 
Employees suggested ideas even without formal rewards, indicating intrinsic motivation or 
implicit incentives. However, our results do not support the view that rewards crowd out intrinsic 
motivation. The reward motivated more employees to participate in ideation and focus on idea 
quality; those ideating prior to the experiment did not reduce innovation when offered the reward. 
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The findings illustrate the utility from experimentation in organizational policies. The firm was 
able to test a new incentive before rolling it out to the entire organization. In addition to providing 
useful information about whether the idea was sound, the experiment provided insights into the 
specific design of the policy. Conceivably the firm could have gone further. For example, they 
might have tried different rewards, perhaps to increase the total number of ideas or encourage 
collaboration in ideation. There may be substantial costs to implementing poorly-designed 
policies, and bureaucratic inertia might make it costly to change or eliminate a policy after it is 
implemented. Moreover, changes to an existing policy might reduce management’s credibility 
with employees. Experimentation can help firms reduce these risks. 
Our findings suggest a tradeoff between quantity and quality in ideation. How strong is this 
tradeoff? What are the implications for job design, team structure, and incentive plan design? Data 
on employee tasks and time management might allow for deeper understanding of this issue. 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that incentives can motivate creativity if designed appropriately. 
The company discontinued the experiment after 13 months of treatment. Its own analysis – a 
comparison of simple averages between treatment and control groups – suggested the incentive 
was ineffective, and it decided not to implement the reward scheme. There are three reasons why 
they reached a different conclusion. First, our approach controls for initial differences between the 
two groups. Second, we look at the subset of ideas that finished review, while the company 
included ideas still under review. That might have introduced a confounding factor if review speeds 
varied (teams with faster reviews might have misleadingly-higher acceptance rates). Third, we 
control for team composition, such as tenure, level, age and gender. Differences between groups 
in those characteristics may affect idea acceptance, but are not easily disentangled from the 
treatment effect using non-regression methods. After seeing our analysis, the company 
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implemented a similar reward scheme for the entire company. The only difference between the 
experimental reward and the one now used is that HCL added additional points for submitting 
ideas, to motivate more participation and a higher quantity of ideas in addition to higher quality. 
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Figure 1. Process for Evaluating New Ideas 
 
 
 
 
Ideation 
1-3 employees in same client 
team develop new idea. 
Submission 
Idea is entered in Idea Portal. 
Supervisor Input / 
Idea Refinement 
Supervisor reviews & helps 
refine within 3 days. 
Executive Review Panel 
One or more members of 
executive panel reviews 
within 20 days. Accepts, 
rejects or returns for 
clarification or refinement. 
Client Review 
If appropriate, idea is shared 
with client. Client reviews & 
accepts or rejects. 
Implementation 
Idea implemented, results 
tracked. In some cases, client 
rates on 1-4 scale after 
implementation. 
Rejection 
Idea is no longer considered. 
	
				


631
 
!"

##$
%%&'(")"*%%
+
# 
	 
,#
'
	 #%+
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Period Treatment Group Control Group Combined
Number of Employees
1 3015 3185 6200
2 5260 5881 11141
3 4061 4511 8572
Mean Age
1 29.4** 29.9 29.7
(4.70) (4.87) (4.80)
2 29.7 29.6 29.7
(5.38) (5.41) (5.40)
3 30.5 30.3 30.4
(5.50) (5.54) (5.52)
Mean Tenure
1 2.99 2.90 2.94
(2.32) (2.34) (2.33)
2 2.97 2.80 2.88
(2.48) (2.37) (2.42)
3 3.73 3.53 3.62
(2.53) (2.30) (2.41)
Share of Men
1 0.78 0.80 0.79
(0.42) (0.40) (0.41)
2 0.76 0.77 0.76
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
3 0.76 0.77 0.76
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (cont.)
Period Treatment Group Control Group Combined
Mean Salary Group
1 1.43 1.45 1.44
(0.73) (0.77) (0.75)
2 1.47 1.47 1.47
(0.79) (0.82) (0.81)
3 1.49 1.49 1.49
(0.81) (0.84) (0.82)
Share of Prior Ideators
1 0.087 0.063 0.075
(0.28) (0.24) (0.26)
2 0.049 0.035 0.042
(0.22) (0.18) (0.20)
3 0.064 0.045 0.054
(0.24) (0.21) (0.23)
Note: Standard deviations of the means are displayed in parentheses. In each line,
the difference of group means is tested with a t-test using standard errors that are
clustered at client team level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5%
level; *significant at the 10% level. Number of employees in period 1 (pre-treatment) is
based on employment roster 1; Number of employees in period 2 (treatment) is based
on rosters 1 and 2; Number of employees in period 3 (post-treatment) is based on
roster 2. Age and tenure are measured at the end of the respective period.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on outcome variables by group for pre-treatment and treatment period
Group Period # of ideas Ideator* Authors Finished Imp|Fin* Shared|Fin* Log(Net Value)
Treatment
1 517 0.195 1.716 0.745 0.410 0.449 8.705
(0.355) (0.893) (0.436) (0.379) (0.440) (2.030)
2 566 0.083 1.309 0.643 0.516 0.597 9.428
(0.264) (0.550) (0.480) (0.461) (0.450) (2.023)
Control
1 361 0.336 1.903 0.634 0.638 0.415 8.865
(0.285) (1.118) (0.482) (0.249) (0.398) (2.083)
2 363 0.112 1.402 0.510 0.712 0.339 9.257
(0.204) (0.667) (0.501) (0.366) (0.446) (2.146)
Note: Ideator is the share of employees who submitted at least one idea in the respective period.
Authors is the mean number of authors per idea. Finished is the share of ideas with finished review;
those ideas are either accepted for implementation or rejected. Imp|Fin and Shared|Fin denote the
shares of ideas selected for implementation or for sharing with the client, respectively, among ideas
with finished review. Log(Net Value) is the mean of the logarithm of the projected profit in US dollar
terms. Period 1 is pre-treatment, period 2 is the treatment period. ∗ denotes client team means (pooled
standard deviations).
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Table 3: Who ideates? Influence of employee characteristics on ideation
(1) Logit AME (2) ZINB AME (3) QML Poisson AME
Dependent variable Ideator Number of Ideas Number of Ideas
Age -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.080***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.023)
Tenure 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.310***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.059)
Male 0.004 -0.056 -0.298
(0.009) (0.042) (0.221)
Salary Groups 0 & 1 pooled -0.094** -0.516* -1.308***
(0.039) (0.291) (0.408)
Salary Group 2 0.005 -0.119 0.009
(0.034) (0.100) (0.339)
Salary Group 3 0.075 0.022 0.531
(0.048) (0.074) (0.429)
Client FE yes yes yes
Log Pseudo likelihood -1416.53 -2177.45 -2954.93
Clusters 18 19 19
Observations 5887 5916 5916
Note: The regressions use data from the pre-treatment period only, where both groups have identical
incentives. Ideator is a dummy indicating whether an employee submitted at least one idea in the given
period. Number of Ideas is the number of ideas submitted within the 13 pre-treatment months. Salary
group is an indicator for an employee’s position in the company hierarchy. The reference category is
(upper) management, that is, salary groups 4 and above. The marginal effects of Age and Tenure are
based on linear and quadratic terms. Standard errors are clustered at the client team level. ***Significant
at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Treatment effects on different measures of idea quality
(1) OLS (2) Logit AME (3) OLS (4) Logit AME (5) OLS
Dependent variable Shared Shared Implemented Implemented Log(Net Value)
DID Treatment 0.209** 0.188** 0.153* 0.177** 0.308
(0.087) (0.079) (0.084) (0.087) (0.390)
Number of Authors 0.082*** 0.092*** 0.060** 0.064*** 0.185**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.069)
Age -0.036 -0.016*** -0.037 -0.012* 0.341*
(0.025) (0.005) (0.025) (0.006) (0.182)
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.005*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Tenure 0.044** 0.032*** 0.014 0.008 0.129*
(0.019) (0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.061)
Tenure2 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Male 0.038 0.037 0.114*** 0.111*** -0.060
(0.055) (0.053) (0.040) (0.034) (0.273)
Controls salary groups yes yes yes yes yes
Controls project type yes yes yes yes yes
Client FE yes yes yes yes yes
Time FE month month month month month
R2 0.687 0.753 0.962
Log Pseudo likelihood -546.45 -457.07
Clusters 19 15 19 17 19
Observations 1779 1697 1779 1747 1912
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Table 5: Treatment effects on different measures of idea quality (cont.)
Note: The table reports estimates of OLS and logistic regressions using as outcome variables the prob-
ability that an idea is shared with the customer (columns 1 and 2), the probability that an idea is
accepted for implementation (columns 3 and 4), and the logarithm of the projected net value (profit
from the idea) (column 5). The treatment effect is the difference-in-differences estimator. The unit of
observation is the author-idea. Each observation is weighted by 1/(Number of Authors), where Number
of Authors represents the number of employees who submit the idea together. Only ideas with finished
review process (either accepted or rejected) are included in the samples for columns (1) to (4). Marginal
effects of Age and Tenure are based on linear and quadratic terms. Standard errors are clustered at the
client team level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10%
level.
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Table 6: Idea quantity and quality, treatment and post treatment effects
(1) ZINB
Logit AME
(2) ZINB
NB AME
(3) Quantity effect
ZINB AME
(4) Quality
Logit AME
Dependent variable Pr(Part.) NumIdeas|Part. NumIdeas Shared
DID Treatment 0.187*** -0.197** -0.014 0.180***
(0.062) (0.094) (0.040) (0.066)
DID Post Treatment 0.255** -0.160 0.026 0.019
(0.106) (0.130) (0.056) (0.202)
Age -0.008*** 0.006 -0.002 -0.012***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004)
Tenure 0.069*** 0.009 0.028*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.003) (0.010)
Male 0.053*** -0.090 -0.007 0.021
(0.019) (0.065) (0.015) (0.045)
Controls salary groups yes yes yes yes
Client FE yes yes yes yes
Time FE period period period month
Log Pseudo likelihood -7767.68 -7767.68 -7767.68 -810.98
Clusters 19 19 19 16
Observations 25152 25152 25152 2310
Note: The table reports marginal effects for a zero inflated negative binomial model explaining the
number of ideas per author and period, and for a Logit model explaining the probability of sharing
an idea with the client. Marginal effects of Age and Tenure are based on linear and quadratic terms.
Standard errors are clustered at the client team level. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at
the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.
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